Suchergebnisse

Design and adoption of common social policy is conditional. Limited competencies, institutional and organizational heterogeneity among member states, and ideological-programmatic majorities in the institutions of the European Union (EU) have led to far fewer new legal instruments in recent decades. One of the key challenges is the unanimity requirement in the Council, enshrined in the Treaties in areas of great member state sovereignty. In 2019 the Commission proposed to allow a transition to qualified majority voting. This paper discusses what the transition entails in legal and procedural terms and highlights three key advantages it holds. To this aim it provides an overview of the policy areas and instruments that the Commission would like to transfer to qualified majority voting. It outlines how the potential that majority voting offers for EU social policy could be exploited better with more ambitious initiatives and discusses differentiated integration as an alternative.

This article constructs an index that translates the substance of policy documents into numeric values across three dimensions of regulation—a qualitative assessment of policy substance, its potential impact, and enforcement of regulation—which aims to capture the strength of social objectives in the economy. It draws on theories of economic regulation and literature on the welfare state to develop a general understanding of social objectives. The use of the index is illustrated through public procurement regulation in two European countries (France and Germany) and shows an overall increase in the strength of social objectives. It also highlights systematic differences in country priorities in the regulation of their economy. The index demonstrates that social regulation can be measured and compared in a meaningful way within and across countries.

Abstract
Despite the fact that economic concerns are the main driver of the EU integration process, integration does carry a substantial social dimension. Yet, it remains an open question whether this social dimension 'only' supports the market or whether goals such as social justice, solidarity and employment conditions are independent of or even work against goals of market efficiency. To address this question the paper presents an original dataset on all 346 binding EU social policy acts adopted since the Union's founding. In a descriptive approach, I contrast instruments and dynamics in areas and subfields connected more closely to the common market with those more directly constituting a social dimension in its own right. On this basis, I argue that the shape of EU social policy has substantially changed, strengthening its market-supporting dimension while weakening policy focused on its social dimension. The paper opens up for discussion possible political dynamics driving these patterns.

Soft law instruments such as recommendations, guidelines or communications do not entail jurisdictional control, but produce important legal and practical effects. The literature on soft law frequently praises these instruments for enhancing governance efficiency through flexible problem solving. On the other hand critiques stress a lack of legitimacy as soft law is typically adopted outside the legislative arena. Yet, relatively little is known about concrete effects it takes at the national level. On the basis of case study evidence from Germany, this chapter shows that despite being non-binding, EU soft law is frequently implemented. Comparing implementation of nine soft law instruments in financial market regulation, social and environmental policy the chapter highlights that actors implement soft EU instruments either in the form of soft or hard law. Efficiency gains are frequently a main driver of implementation, while legitimacy and accountability become a concern where responsibilities are blurred during implementation.

Despite the fact that economic concerns are the main driver of the EU integration process, integration does carry a substantial social dimension. Yet, it remains an open question whether this social dimension 'only' supports the market or whether goals such as social justice, solidarity and employment conditions are independent of or even work against goals of market efficiency. To address this question the paper presents an original dataset on all 346 binding EU social policy acts adopted since the Union's founding. In a descriptive approach, I contrast instruments and dynamics in areas and subfields connected more closely to the common market with those more directly constituting a social dimension in its own right. On this basis, I argue that the shape of EU social policy has substantially changed, strengthening its market-supporting dimension while weakening policy focused on its social dimension. The paper opens up for discussion possible political dynamics driving these patterns.

L'élaboration des politiques dans l'UE a été décrite comme fortement fragmentée : les initiatives sont rédigées dans des directions générales distinctes de la Commission européenne, analysées au sein de communautés politiques spécifiques, et décidées au sein de commissions sectorielles du Parlement européen et de formations du Conseil. Dans le même temps, on note l'existence d'un nombre croissant de problèmes politiques complexes qui exigent des solutions intégrées intersectorielles. Le présent article avance qu'il existe de bonnes raisons d'attendre de la Commission européenne qu'elle favorise des solutions fragmentées, alors que les intérêts publics disparates auront tendance à promouvoir des politiques intégrées. Toutefois, c'est seulement dans le cadre de constellations spécifiques que la Commission européenne répondra à ces intérêts. L'argument sera démontré à l'aide d'études de cas portant sur trois instruments de politique qui traitent des politiques de soins de santé transfrontaliers. Alors que la coordination de la réglementation des systèmes de sécurité sociale et des services dans la directive sur le marché intérieur favorise des solutions largement fragmentées, la directive sur la mobilité des patients adopte une approche plus intégrée. Remarques à l'intention des praticiens Aujourd'hui, les problèmes politiques complexes requièrent fréquemment des solutions politiques intégrées qui transcendent les frontières organisationnelles et les domaines de responsabilité. Dans le même temps, la prise de décision est souvent plus facile si les solutions politiques restent fragmentées. La coordination interne constitue, pour les administrations publiques, un moyen important de parvenir à des solutions politiques intégrées plutôt que fragmentées. Les périodes où l'attention du public est soutenue sont plus susceptibles de déboucher sur des solutions politiques plus intégrées, puisque les décideurs exploiteront la coordination interne pour anticiper les intérêts d'un public plus large qui suit le processus d'élaboration des politiques. Des preuves sont fournies par les processus de rédaction au sein de la Commission européenne sur les actes transfrontaliers en matière de soins de santé.

AbstractBesides infringement and preliminary ruling procedures, actions for annulment form a third important category of procedures brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). A subset of these actions is 'horizontal litigation', where EU institutions litigate against other EU institutions. Based on a new dataset covering all horizontal annulment conflicts (1957–2017), this contribution analyzes conflict patterns. I identify the most typical litigant constellations and link them to substantial battles over competences including winners and losers. Using the example of EU external affairs, I show how annulment actions have shaped the relationship between EU institutions over time, with impact as significant as treaty changes. In sum, the analysis of this so far 'forgotten' type of procedure furthers our systematic understanding of policy development and competence allocation in the EU system.

Besides infringement and preliminary ruling procedures, actions for annulment form a third important category of procedures brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). A subset of these actions is 'horizontal litigation', where EU institutions litigate against other EU institutions. Based on a new dataset covering all horizontal annulment conflicts (1957–2017), this contribution analyzes conflict patterns. I identify the most typical litigant constellations and link them to substantial battles over competences including winners and losers. Using the example of EU external affairs, I show how annulment actions have shaped the relationship between EU institutions over time, with impact as significant as treaty changes. In sum, the analysis of this so far 'forgotten' type of procedure furthers our systematic understanding of policy development and competence allocation in the EU system.

EU scholars have studied mobilization as a cross-level phenomenon. Individuals and organized interests seek preliminary rulings with the Court of Justice of the EU to challenge national rules. Likewise, the Commission takes member states to court where they infringe commonly agreed rules. However, litigation can also run horizontally in the EU system. EU institutions can go to court to annul actions of other EU institutions. Studying this so far neglected phenomenon of litigation, the paper analyses differences in mobilization across European Parliament, Council and Commission. To this aim it conceptualizes litigation decisions as resulting from an interplay of agency and structure. Decision-making within organizations and in the EU political system as well as different motivations of actors are presented to explain differences in horizontal litigation. Methodologically the analysis combines a database covering 160 horizontal annulment conflicts (1957 to 2017) and case studies based on expert interviews.